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RESUMEN
Este articulo tiene como punto de enfoque el ana´lisis de los estados
ma´s de´biles en el comercio internacional durante las crisis revolucionaria y
napoleo´nica, con especial e´nfasis en las relaciones comerciales entre Portugal y
los Estados Unidos. Defendemos que los estudios anteriores con respecto al
comercio en estos conflictos no prestan la debida atencio´n a los ma´s pequen˜os.
Aunque las Guerra de la Independencia habı´a perturbado la produccio´n agrı´-
cola en Portugal, los Estados Unidos, a pesar de haber tensado las relaciones
con Gran Bretan˜a, un aliado de Portugal, se convirtieron en un proveedor clave
para el Mercado portugue´s. La posicio´n amenazada de la penı´nsula y la
necesidad de proveer al eje´rcito, dio a los portugueses el margen de maniobra
en los mercados internacionales. La guerra total no fue un obsta´culo para
todos los estados — las necesidades econo´micas se superponen a las cuestiones
polı´ticas y diploma´ticas durante la e´poca de la guerra del mundo real en primer
lugar. Esa situacio´n era temporal y cambiarı´a despue´s del conflicto.
Palabras clave: Guerras Napoleo´nicas y Revoluciona´rias, Portugal,
Estados Unidos, comercio, estados pequen˜os, estados ma´s de´biles, guerra total
1. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the trade relations between Portugal and the United States
from Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and their aftermath can contribute
to a deeper understanding of a period featuring massive international
upheavals and disruptions of trade. Overcoming a major lack of studies
regarding trade relations between Portugal and the United States in this
period, a database has been created by Cristina Moreira, based on Portuguese
and American quantitative and qualitative sources, which will be expanded in
the next few years and eventually made available to other scholars. Trade
relations were then analysed in conjunction with American quantitative data
and several qualitative sources.
This paper taps into an important field of analysis, namely the discussion
of the economic impacts of war on trade, as well as the role of neutral and/or
weaker states in wartime situations. Many scholars have recently analysed
the disruptions caused by major conflicts such as the world wars, and recent
scholarship certainly puts the revolutionary wars and the contingent Napo-
leonic conflicts into the same category. However, these scholars have paid
relatively little attention to the smaller (often neutral) players, such as the
Nordic countries, in these wars, frequently assuming that they occupied an
insignificant role in the conflict. Portugal, in particular, suffered three French
invasions during Napoleon’s rule, and, as it did not adhere to the Continental
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blockade, it experienced trade restrictions with several of its former suppliers.
The United States, a weak military power at best at the time, became a major
trading partner for Portugal, despite its strained relations with an ally of
Portugal, Great Britain, and a key supplier for the Portuguese market,
especially during the Continental System. It seems that some neutral and/or
weaker nations were able to exploit the great demands of total war for their
own economic benefit. However, beginning after 1812, the war pitting the
United States against England brought new difficulties for the United States–
Portuguese trade, as U.S. shipments with cereals and flour were frequently
captured by England. The reversal of the political situation after the second
defeat of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna once again changed the
external environment for trade.
In this article, we want to analyse the changes in the Portuguese trade
relations with the United States during an extremely turbulent period in
history. We want to explore the kinds of changes, including structural,
we see in the trade flows between these two weak states, especially whether
the pressure of the war effort allowed more latitude for these states to explore
their trade options; whether we see substantial changes, and what those
changes would imply, in the types of goods exchanged over this complex
period; what the significance of this trade was for both countries; and, finally,
whether economic and business concerns overrode political and diplomatic
obstacles in these trade relations, thereby opening up opportunities for the
smaller/weaker states. Our argument is that weak states were able to expand
their trade and discover new markets during such large and protracted conflicts,
although this was, as in the case of Portuguese trade in this period, typically a
shorter-term phenomenon. The networks gained during such conflicts would
not last during peacetime, when market conditions changed.
2. RESEARCH ON TRADE AND THE WORLD WARS: WHAT ROLE
DID THE «WEAKER» STATES PLAY?
The transition from the end of the 18th century to the first decades of the
19th century was marked by political instability in Europe. The expansion of
the ideals of the French Revolution, and the spread of war driven by imper-
ialistic France caused deep instability in Europe. Across the Atlantic, other
wars were giving birth to new nations and the world was facing tremendous
changes. The understanding of the trade relations between great powers,
neutrals and/or smaller states, in this case between the United States and
Portugal from 1796 to 1831 (thus including also the post-war impact), can
provide a deeper insight into an understudied period in terms of international
trade. We have created a new database on United States–Portuguese trade,
based on Portuguese handwritten sources, which have opened up the possi-
bility of obtaining a series of data for 36 consecutive years. This research was
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reinforced by other quantitative data and several qualitative sources,
including: 1) Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations and Portu-
guese Colonies — quantitative data covering the 36 years between 1796 and
1831; 2) Monthly Military General Account of Provisions from 1815 to 18161;
3) Various qualitative sources, such as consular and military correspon-
dence, memoirs and legislation2; 4) United States «Foreign Commerce and
Navigation» from 1808 to 18143. In addition, we utilised other statistical
compilations. On the basis of these new data, we want to provide new per-
spectives on Portuguese trade in this crucial period, and engage the relevant
debates in the field of economic history concerning economic warfare and
the effect of conflicts on trade.
This paper taps into an important field of analysis, namely the discussion
of the economic impacts of war on trade, as well as the role of smaller/
weaker states in wartime situations. In recent years, the economic impacts
of warfare have become a lively topic of study among economists and his-
torians (see, e.g. Harrison 1998; see also Broadberry and Harrison 2005)4.
Many scholars — including Alan Taylor and Reuven Glick, Lance Davis and
Stanley Engerman, as well as Ronald Findley and Kevin O’Rourke — have
recently analysed the disruptions caused by major conflicts such as the world
wars. Alan Taylor and Reuven Glick studied the indirect economic effects of
wars, in particular World Wars I and II, with a large database, using an
econometric gravity model. Their analysis, focusing on disruptions of trade
and the subsequent economic losses, yielded clear results: Trade was clearly
disrupted by wars, levels of trade did not return to pre-war levels, and these
economic disruptions affected even those countries that were not directly
involved in the conflict (Glick and Taylor 2005). Such impacts were clearly
part of the overall story of the world wars and the entire 20th century, which
featured uneven economic performances, political instability, and major eco-
nomic and political crises for Europe and the world as a whole. The average
growth rates of most European states during the era of the world wars were
modest at best compared to the late 19th century performances or the so-called
Golden Age, 1950-1973 (Maddison 1995; 2001)5.
1 Arquivo Tribunal de Contas (Archives of the Audit Court): ER 5451.
2 Arquivo Histo´rico Militar (Military Historic Archive) and Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais
Torre do Tombo (Institute of National Archives/Torre do Tombo).
3 American State Papers – Legislative and Executive Documents of the Congress of the United
States.
4 Classic studies of this type include Alan Milward’s works on the European war economies;
see, for example, Milward (1965) and Milward (1977).
5 For a broad analysis of trade patterns and conflicts, see especially Findlay and O’Rourke
(2007). Of course, one could also argue that the economic growth of the so-called Golden Age was
partially premised on the reconstruction efforts arising from the war. Or, as, for example, Mancur
Olson has argued, that the destruction of interest groups faciliated economic growth. See, for
example, Olson (1982). However, the empirical support for the latter hypothesis seems mixed. See
especially Gray and Lowery (1988, pp. 109-131) and Coates and Heckelman (1993, pp. 333-340).
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Many scholars have doubted the efficacy of economic warfare, which can
range from fairly benign policy measures and pressure to outright warfare in
the context of total war6. Lance Davis and Stanley Engerman have studied
one particular form of economic warfare, naval blockades, spanning several
centuries. They also emphasise both the costs and challenges of sustaining a
successful blockade. For example, during the Napoleonic wars the legalities
of blockades were not that clearly agreed upon, especially the issue of neu-
trality. The success of a blockade, as they point out, is often difficult to assess
as well (Davis and Engerman 2006; see also Crouzet 1964, pp. 567-588).
Periods of outright warfare, even blockades, can bring substantial opportu-
nities for trade. As several scholars have emphasised, rising relative prices
and substantial profits may be the answer to why such risky situations bring
forth increases in trade (Thornton and Ekelund 2004)7. Moreover, recent
scholarship, as presented by, for example, David Bell, certainly puts the revo-
lutionary wars and the ensuing Napoleonic conflicts into the same category as
the world wars (Bell 2007). Finally, Kevin O’Rourke has provided innovative
insights into the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars by focusing on the con-
traction of trade in particular. His results show that Great Britain was the least
affected of the belligerents, whereas France and the United States suffered
more. The welfare losses were around 5-6 per cent for the United States, which
could be classified as substantial (O’Rourke 2006, pp. 123-149).
What are we trying to argue on the basis of these findings? First, the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars were truly total wars based on the
methods chosen by the belligerents. Second, the parameters of economic
warfare were not very clearly defined or enforced. Third, the effects of the
war spilled over to influence the relations between neutrals as well. Fourth,
owing to the fact that these wars had an impact on the trade relations of
all nations, many countries scrambled to find new outlets and sources for
their trade. Fifth, the United States was particularly hard hit by these wars,
which forced it to seek alternative trading partners and networks. Sixth, in
this situation, the weaker and/or smaller states –– such as Portugal — which
was both weak and small –– increased, albeit temporarily, owing to new
market opportunities amidst rising profits. In sum, war, even total war, was
not necessarily bad for everyone economically — there were opportunities to
be exploited because of the heightened demand for commodities and war
material. However, given the existing findings on such wars, it is highly likely
that such advantages were short lived.
Scholars have paid relatively little attention to the smaller players in times
of war, often assuming that they occupied an insignificant role in the conflict.
6 See, for example, Milward (2005) and Naylor (2001). On the variety of methods for engaging
in economic warfare, see O’Leary (1985, pp. 179-206) and Førland (1993, pp. 151-162).
7 On the substantial scholarship focusing on the American Civil War blockades, see, for
example, Wise (1991) and Hetherington and Kower (2009).
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«Small power» and «smaller state» as usually, erroneously, imply small
geographic size. A more fitting definition can perhaps be found in the use of
the term «weak state». This concept also applies to countries of considerable
area, which were nonetheless weak players in the international system
(Handel 1981; see also Eloranta 2002, pp. 44-67)8. Here we would posit that
Portugal, despite also being a war zone for some of this period, was indeed
such a state; a state that increased its international trade despite the diffi-
culties brought on by the global conflict. The United States was a weak state,
and for the most part in this period neutral too, given its short existence and
limited military power.
Weak and/or neutral states, including, for example, the Nordic countries
for most of this period (when they were not under occupation), served a
vital function during a wartime trading system, when traditional trading
networks between great powers were disrupted. As Leos Mu¨ller has shown,
the concept of neutrality, implying impartiality during a particular conflict,
evolved in the 17th century, and neutral participation in trade reduced
transaction costs among the belligerents, circumventing blockades and other
trade restrictions. The ability to use neutral states as trading partners and
carriers of goods prevented the wholesale collapse of the trading system
during the era of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts (Mu¨ller 2001,
pp. 30-47; 2004; see also Davis and Engerman 2006)9. Neutral states, which
were treated differently by the belligerents based on past history and alli-
ances, had to function in a treacherous economic environment, despite their
efforts to pressure the great powers to recognise and respect their neutrality
status, for example, by forming loose alliances between neutrals. To make
this trading environment even more difficult, the British and Napoleon
effectively instituted blockades on each other after 1802, developing later
into the infamous Continental System by Napoleon in 1806 (Davis and
Engerman 2006, particularly Chapter 2)10. Neutrals, such as the United
States and the Nordic countries for some years of the period, tried to find
their niches under these conditions, and although the risks were high, the
payoffs were high too. Belligerent nations were desperate for goods and
supplies. In fact, the Continental System increased trading opportunities
for some nations, and increased the transit trade between the neutrals
(Mu¨ller 2004, Chapter 7). Although there have been studies on the trade
behaviour of some of the neutral states, including the United States, the
8 On the concept of small states in general, see Joenniemi (1998, pp. 61-62).
9 On definitions of neutrality, as well as small state challenges, see Karsh (1988) and Ackerman
(1983, pp. 372-390). On the American interpretations of neutrality and its implications in this time
period, see especially Bukovansky (2003, pp. 209-243). Obviously many nations have changed their
status from neutral to active belligerent during conflicts, for example the United States during this
particular period.
10 For an innovative look at the Napoleonic power politics and alliances, see Rosecrance and Lo
(1996, pp. 479-500). For a classic account on the Continental System, see Heckscher (1922).
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networks between the neutrals and the even the great powers have not yet
been studied adequately11.
Ultimately, it is completely natural to focus most of the attention in the
scholarship to the analysis of the great powers, such as Great Britain and
France. After all, it is quite staggering to conceptualise the evolution of an
empire such as Great Britain, from its humble beginnings in the 16th century
along with the building of the navy and its first major victory against the
Spanish Armada to the multicultural, industrialised empire that ruled the
world in the 19th century12. Moreover, the desire to understand the despe-
rate, global conflict for supremacy from the 1790s to 1815 and Britain’s role
in this process is again quite understandable (see, for example, Bell 2007)13.
Or the focus on the naval battles and strategies of these wars, including the
building and development of the great fleets, seems quite logical and worthy
of intense scholarship14. Yet, the intense nature of these rivalries and the
total wars between the great powers, in fact, also explain why they had to rely
on alliances and often lesser powers to complement their war efforts. There-
fore, even a great power like Great Britain had to tolerate the activities of the
neutral and/or weaker states, increasing their importance at least temporarily,
sometimes to the detriment of their own war efforts.
3. OVERALL TRENDS IN THE PORTUGUESE EXTERNAL TRADE
How did Portugal get dragged into these conflicts? The emergence of open
conflict between France and England during this period, namely the campaign
of Rossilha˜o (1793-1795), instigated an alliance of England with Spain and
Portugal against France, two very different alliances in total. Although France
had a superior population, Britain was wealthier, had a more developed
economy and ruled the overseas trade with its feared naval power.
Because Britain was in command of the seas, British strategy hinged on
harming France’s economy, to prevent any French merchant ship from
reaching continental ports. The French in turn, ruling the land, tried to pre-
vent British ships from entering those same ports. However, this strategy also
affected the neutral nations, who could no longer receive goods that had to
pass the blockade imposed by the British navy. As a consequence, and owing
to diplomatic pressure from Napoleon, Russia, Sweden and Denmark, in 1800,
11 See the studies listed in Mu¨ller (2004). On Denmark, see also Ruppenthal (1943, pp. 7-23). On
American trade history and the impact of the blockades, see Keene (1978, pp. 681-700) and Hickey
(1981, pp. 517-538).
12 The literature on the great empires is massive and cannot be adequately summarised here.
Some of it is discussed in an interesting theoretical article about how and why such empires have
come about: Turchin (2008, pp. 191-217).
13 On the debt burden incurred by Great Britain, reaching at its height over 300 per of GDP, see
Ferguson (2001).
14 On the history of the British naval fleet, see especially Kennedy (1998).
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formed the League of Armed Neutrality and forced the British navy out of the
Baltic ports and German states15.
After many confrontations, the British won the battle of Copenhagen. The
Danes surrendered and peace was established in May, 1801, followed by
Sweden and Russia. Nevertheless, the broader conflict had not ended. Britain
and France were still at war because the British wanted to help the Turks to
expel the French from Egypt. Finally, the French retired their army in June of
the same year. At this point, both parts were exhausted, and a peace treaty
was signed in Amiens, in March 180216.
But hostilities between Britain and France renewed shortly, on May 1803.
Even though Napoleon declared France an empire on May 18, 1804 and
crowned himself as the Emperor, he did not dare to try recovering the
colonies lost outside Europe because of the British naval superiority, which
continued to disrupt France’s extra-continental trade. Britain also had the
greatest industrial capacity in Europe, which contributed to its mastery of
the seas, allowing it to build up a considerable economic strength through
trade and to import raw materials from her colonies. Moreover, Britain’s goal
was to make sure that France would never control Europe, while the French
government thought it was possible to isolate Britain from the continent.
Thus, the two nations went on trying to defeat each other. On the one hand,
Napoleon could never defeat Britain at sea; on the other, Britain could only
mount a serious challenge to France by gathering coalitions. The War of the
Third Coalition intensified the ongoing conflict, during which the Battle of
Trafalgar in October 1805 reaffirmed the British naval supremacy. But it was
not until the Battle of Waterloo, on June 18, 1815, that the Seventh Coalition,
under the command of the Duke of Wellington, was able to defeat the
Imperial French Army for good, putting an end to Napoleon’s rule as
Emperor of France and restoring Louis XVIII to the French throne.
Spain, a reluctant ally of France at best, became the first victim of Napo-
leon in the peninsula. In 1808, he installed his own brother on the Spanish
throne after overthrowing the existing government. This thrust the country
into chaos and enduring conflict. Thus, the war destabilised not only Portugal,
but also Spain. The central authority, in essence, collapsed in Spain during the
main thrust of this conflict, from 1808 onwards. Moreover, it was the military
forces, often forming local juntas that took over governance at this time,
militarising the Spanish society. Furthermore, the military itself was divided
into countless quasi-independent units that ruled over their regional domains17.
Spain’s great power status had already been eroding for some time before
this war. In particular, its trade links with the colonies had been weakened
15 See especially Kennedy (1998) for further discussion.
16 On the negotiations and the breakdown of peace afterwards, see Grainger (2004).
17 On the military’s role and fragmentation, see Esdaile (1988). On Napoleon’s war in Spain,
see, for example, Gates (2002).
CRISTINA MOREIRA/JARI ELORANTA
400 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
significantly. Although Spain was not necessarily in decline as an empire, it
certainly was not the same entity as the one described brilliantly by Henry
Kamen for the earlier centuries (Esdaile 2003, pp. 9-10; Kamen 2003).
Bearing in mind the close relation and an old alliance between the Por-
tuguese and British Empires, as well as the geographic and strategic position
of continental Portugal, which made it a natural prey for the expanding
French empire, it is quite natural to analyse the extent of the Portuguese
involvement in the conflict and the overall trade impacts. The Peninsular
War involved three French invasions of Portugal (1807-1808; 1809; 1810-1811)
and, together with the Spanish War of Independence from 1809 until 1814,
generated deep instability in the Iberian Peninsula. Since the transmigration
of the Portuguese Regent, Prince D. Joa˜o, and the Royal Court to Brazil in
November 1807, Portugal’s army had been helped and commanded by English
forces, the Peninsular Army, and the invaders were eventually defeated. This
help came mainly because of the Portuguese refusal to accept the continental
blockade imposed by the French Empire in 1806. The Iberian Peninsula was
devastated during this period, suffering massive deaths, pillage, and many
fields were burned in order to prevent the advance of the enemy army. One
irrefutable reality of this situation was the tremendous lack of cereals to feed
the population, not to mention the Peninsular Army.
As a consequence of the close relations between Portuguese and British
Empires, already established as an ancient alliance and strengthened during
the early years of the 19th century, England was both the main supplier and
client of the Portuguese market. In the period from 1808 to 1813, when some
external markets such as Holland, Prussia, France, Denmark and Hamburg
ceased their trade relations with the Portuguese (the latter three from 1809
onwards), the English, American and Spanish merchants pursued this trade
(Moreira 2005: 14). Although distant, the American market took on a key
position in terms of imports during the Peninsular War, a development that
deserves to be highlighted and analysed further18.
As Leos Mu¨ller has shown, American shipping increased dramatically
during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts, with a 300 per cent
increase in capacity. American shipowners focused heavily on export trade,
which meant that they had to find suitable return cargoes. Moreover, as the
Napoleonic conquests continued, there were fewer places to do business with
in Europe. Therefore, the Nordic markets, Sweden in particular since it was
not conquered, formed important destinations for the Americans (Mu¨ller
2004, Chapter 7). Similarly, the Portuguese trade with the Nordic countries
increased substantially during the war years, although there were some years
during which trade was also curtailed. Trade with the other neutrals helped
circumvent wartime regulations and shifting alliances, and formed impor-
tant niche markets for countries such as Portugal and the United States.
18 On the trade patterns before 1770, see Fisher (1963, pp. 219-233).
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In order to analyse the flow of trade between the United States and
Portugal, we divided the analysis of the trade into five periods in order to
trace the evolution. The years at the close of the 18th century, the first period,
were connected to the early 19th century with the opening of the Brazilian
ports to the international trade. The third period encompassed the opening of
the Brazilian ports until the end of the French invasions in Portugal. The years
1812-1814 were distinguished by the ongoing French invasions in Spain and
the war between England and the United States. The subsequent phase
encompassed the years after the Peninsular war until the end of that decade.
The focal point of the last time period was the third decade of 19th century.
What did the overall trends in the trade look like? On the basis of Cristina
Moreira’s research, it seems that the big suppliers of the Portuguese imports
represented more than 89 per cent of Portuguese imports from 1796 to 183119.
Table 1 displays the importance of American exports to Portugal, that is,
whether the United States was among the top eight suppliers of goods to
Portugal. It is surprising that, from 1808 to 1813, during the Continental
blockade and eventually the War of 1812, the United States was not only
the second-most important importer, but also that Portuguese imports from
the United States reached their highest value (6,297 contos, 28.5 per cent)
during this period, which was nearly six times higher than the average for the
previous period20.
What specific demand elements drove those significant imports during
that period? Or, respectively, why would Portugal be willing or be able to
trade so much with a country that was not on particularly good terms (or
even at war for some of the period) with its main ally, Great Britain, during a
period in which both Britain and France were trying to control trade flows?
Before we go further, we need to examine the structure of the demand for
U.S. products. From a detailed analysis of Portuguese imports from the
United States by product, the main conclusion to be drawn is that during the
Peninsular War the United States was a particularly important supplier of
cereals, mainly flour, corn, wheat and rice, all commodities that were used to
support the British troops and the war effort. Imports became even more
important when compared with the role of Portuguese exports to the United
States in the same period.
In the context of the bicentennial commemorations of the French inva-
sions, it is worth noting that during the Peninsular War the importance of
Portuguese imports from the United States grew significantly because of the
19 This research focuses on analysing Balanças Gerais do Come´rcio do Reyno de Portugal
com os seus Domı´nios Ultramarinos e Naço˜es Estrangeiras, which provides continual series from
1796 to 1831. Until 1796, we only have Balanças Gerais do Come´rcio do Reyno de Portugal com os
seus Domı´nios Ultramarinos e Naço˜es Estrangeira for certain years, that is, 1776, 1777, 1783, 1787 y
1789, whereas for the period after the first half of the century Portugal produced only two Balanças
de Come´rcio: the 1843 and 1848 editions. See Moreira (2005) for further discussion.
20 Calculated from the same sources as those listed under Table 1.
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demand for cereals. Simultaneously, the highest Portuguese exports to the
United States coincide, in 1812-1814, with the highest import totals, although
the annual average was only 834 contos (6.6 per cent of all Portuguese exports,
United States being its fifth biggest customer). Curiously, the highest export
totals were reached in 1812 with 1,941 contos (see Table 2 for details).
As seen in Figures 1 and 2, in terms of the development of Portuguese
trade relations with the United States during this turbulent period, imports
were mostly higher than exports during the most relevant trade years (until
1820), with the exception of the years 1799, 1800, 1805 and 1815.
Although the apparent patterns revealed by the data tables and figures
displayed so far suggest certain conclusions, it is not enough to simply
«eyeball» the data to find conclusive trends and patterns. What about the
Portuguese external trade time series, both exports and imports, themselves,
do they reveal anything about the importance and timing of the changes
in the trading patterns? Does the analysis of the series support the earlier
TABLE 1
IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN MARKET IN TERMS OF VALUE AND ORIGINS
OF PORTUGUESE IMPORTS
USA
Year
Portuguese import
values (contos de re´is) Position
Percentage of
Portuguese imports
1796-1800 16,333 Not included among the
eight main markets of
origin
1801-1807 17,169 6th 6.9
1808-1811 16,833 2nd 26.9
1812-1814 29,347 2nd 22.8
1815-1820 17,619 6th 4.3
1821-1831 12,403(a) Not included among the
eight main markets of
origin
Sources: This information has been collated from Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations
and Portuguese Colonies’, Portugal’s Balance of Trade with the U.S. Arquivo Histo´rico do Rio de Janeiro,
Balança Geral do Commercio do Reyno de Portugal com as Naço˜es Estrangeiras de 1798 e 1808 (Portugal’s
Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations in 1798 and 1808) Contadoria da Superintendeˆncia Geral dos
Contrabandos e Descaminhos dos Reais Direitos. Instituto Nacional de Estatı´stica, Balanças Gerais do
Come´rcio do Reyno de Portugal com os seus Domı´nios Ultramarinos e Naço˜es Estrangeiras de 1796-1797,
1799-1807, 1809-1831 (Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations and Portuguese Colonies 1796-
1797, 1799-1807, 1809-1831), Contadoria da Superintendeˆncia Geral.
(a)10,782 not including the Brazilian market, as registered in the external trade balance from the year
1827. Although the value in the table referring to years 1821-1831 includes the Brazilian trade with
Portugal from 1826 due to the Rio de Janeiro Treaty on August 29, 1825, in which Portugal recognized the
independence of Brazil.
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observations about the changing nature of trade during the blockade and
hostilities between Britain and the United States. Thus, we decided to work
the data further to test the structural qualities of Portuguese exports to
the United States; Portuguese imports to the United States; and an index of
trade balance (exports/imports3 100) for the period 1796-183121. The main
purpose of this exercise is to pinpoint the exact years during which the trade
patterns changed, to compare those findings with the other quantitative and
qualitative analyses. To make sure that the unit roots would not distort the
results of the structural tests, we performed Augmented Dickey–Fuller and
Phillips–Perron tests on the series. The null of a unit root was rejected for all
three series. Then we decided to use the Quandt–Andrews Breakpoint Test to
determine whether there were one or more unknown structural breakpoints
in the time series. The Quandt–Andrews test applies Chow Breakpoint Tests
at every observation between two dates to test against the null hypothesis of
no breakpoints. From each individual Chow Breakpoint Test, two statistics
TABLE 2
IMPORTANCE OF U.S. MARKET IN TERMS OF VALUE AND DESTINATION OF
PORTUGUESE EXPORTS
USA
Year
Portuguese export values
(contos de re´is) Position
Percentage of Portuguese
exports
1796-1800 16,253 5th 2.9
1801-1807 22,287 7th 2.3
1808-1811 8,776 5th 3.5
1812-1814 12,652 5th 6.6
1815-1820 15,221 6th 2.9
1821-1831 9,552(a) 8th 2.4
Sources: This information has been collated from Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations
and Portuguese Colonies’, Portugal’s Balance of Trade with the U.S. Arquivo Histo´rico do Rio de Janeiro,
Balança Geral do Commercio do Reyno de Portugal com as Naço˜es Estrangeiras de 1798 e de 1808 (Portugal’s
Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations in 1798 and 1808) Contadoria da Superintendeˆncia Geral dos
Contrabandos e Descaminhos dos Reais Direitos. Instituto Nacional de Estatı´stica, Balanças Gerais do
Come´rcio do Reyno de Portugal com os seus Domı´nios Ultramarinos e Naço˜es Estrangeiras de 1796-1797,
1799-1807, 1809-1831 (Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations and Portuguese Colonies 1796-
1797, 1799-1807, 1809-1831), Contadoria da Superintendeˆncia Geral.
(a)8,223 not including the Brazilian market, as registered in the external trade balance from the year
1827, that is, Portuguese Exports to the United States, 2.8 per cent of its total value. Although the value in
the table referring to years 1821-1831 included the Brazilian trade with Portugal from 1826 due to the Rio
de Janeiro Treaty on August 29, 1825, in which Portugal recognised the independence of Brazil.
21 For a similar approach, that is, to determine the structural qualities of time series to
counterbalance the empirical, historical story, see, for example, Meisel and Baro´n (2010).
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FIGURE 1
PORTUGUESE EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES,
1796-1831
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FIGURE 2
RATIO OF PORTUGUESE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS WITH THE UNITED STATES
AND THE RATIO OF TOTAL PORTUGUESE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS,
1796-1831
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were retained, the Likelihood Ratio F-statistic and the Wald F-statistic. We
used the Likelihood Ratio F-statistic, which is based on the comparison of
the restricted and unrestricted sums of squared residuals. Moreover, we used
a simple autoregressive model in which: y5 a1 by (t21)1 error term, with
each of the three series in turn as the dependent variable.
As seen in Table 3, both the Portuguese imports and the index of trade
balance seemed to contain breakpoints. For the imports in particular, the
break occurred in the middle of the war between Britain and the United
States, which is in line with our initial observations. However, we need to
look deeper into the structural qualities of these series, to pinpoint the effects
of the disturbances in them over time.
We first looked at the behaviour of recursive residuals (which essentially
calculates a one-step forecast error) for the three series, and then the N-step
probability (which carries out a sequence of Chow Forecast tests and resi-
duals) tests. The results can be seen in Figure 3. For the Portuguese exports,
the War of 1812 was a major shock, although the adjustment was fairly
quick. The same applies to the imports as well, although the shock seems to
have persisted longer. Moreover, the relationship between exports and
imports was structurally fairly sound until the 1820s, significantly after the
war years. These results underline our main argument — the Napoleonic
Wars altered the structure and context of Portugal’s foreign trade. Most
likely, however, the impact was fairly short lived. As we have already
claimed, this period of conflicts opened up new opportunities for weaker
nations like Portugal, giving them temporarily broader leverage in their trade
relations, owing to high demand for certain products. The networks culti-
vated during the wartime, and especially during periods of very high demand
like 1806-1813, would not last into the post-war period. Next, we will first
take a closer look at the Portuguese imports and then the exports.
3.1. Portuguese Imports from the United States
What about more detailed trends in the imports? Or the types of products
imported? From 1796 to 1831, cereals were predominantly the most
important U.S. products imported by the Portuguese, representing 68-95 per
cent of total Portuguese imports (see Table 4)22. Furthermore, Portuguese
imports from the United States, during the entire period 1796-1831, achieved
the highest values during the key years of the Napoleonic conflicts, identi-
fying a greater Portuguese demand for U.S. products.
The main cereals were flour, corn, wheat and rice, as shown in Table 4.
The United States supplied the crucial basic cereals for human survival
22 Except for 1796 (staves comprising 66.0 per cent) and two other years, 1814 and 1820, which
include different products that represented less than 10 per cent of the total imports, with the
exception of butter (14.5 per cent) in 1814 and fish oil (16.1 per cent) in 1820.
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during this troubled period, but not only for the civilians. These products
were even more crucial for the needs of the Luso–British army, which fought
the French on the Portuguese and Spanish soil during the Peninsular War.
Flour was consistently the most important cereal supplied, with the value
increasing approximately fourfold between 1812 and 1814 when compared
to 1801-1807. Corn was the second major product supplied, and its value
TABLE 3
STATISTICAL QUALITIES AND BREAKPOINTS FOR PORTUGUESE EXPORTS
(POREXP) AND IMPORTS (PORIMP) TO THE UNITED STATES, AND INDEX OF
TRADE BALANCE (PORBAL), 1796-1831
POREXP PORIMP PORBAL
Mean 410,733 1,510,390 110.3
Median 309,114 473,899 93.5
Max. 1,940,511 13,627,719 489.3
Min. 665,531 74,236 4.8
Coefficient of Variation 0.84 2.08 0.97
N 36 36 36
Quandt–Andrews Breakpoint Year (P-value of
Likelihood Ratio F-statistic in parenthesis)
1818
(0.85)
1813
(0.05)
1822
(0.03)
Sources: Same as in the data tables included in this article. Exports and imports expressed in thousands.
FIGURE 3
RECURSIVE RESIDUALS (FIRST ROW) AND N-STEP PROBABILITIES OF
STRUCTURAL DISTURBANCES FOR THE THREE TIME SERIES
Sources: See previous tables.
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increased massively during this period. Wheat and rice also contributed to
the growth of the imports of cereals during the Peninsular War.
Focusing on annual imports from the United States in the period between
1796 and 1831, and bearing in mind that in the decade of 1821-1831 imports
were much smaller by comparison, we can discern a much more precise
picture of the dimensions of the yearly demand for cereals (Table 5).
TABLE 4
MAIN U.S. PRODUCTS IMPORTED BY PORTUGAL, 1796-1820 (PER CENT)
Year Percentage of total imports Flour Corn Wheat Rice
1796 14.0 3.3 96.7 0.0 0.0
1797 77.0 24.3 8.0 1.7 65.9
1798 78.7 9.1 42.3 7.4 41.1
1799 78.5 4.3 71.5 6.6 17.6
1800 73.4 19.9 71.4 0.0 8.7
1801 95.2 14.4 23.2 0.3 0.5
1802 86.1 76.0 43.5 3.2 5.5
1803 96.1 47.8 27.7 24.9 1.3
1804 90.0 46.1 35.4 13.4 0.9
1805 69.1 50.3 26.6 19.9 0.0
1806 87.7 53.5 14.4 6.1 0.0
1807 93.9 79.5 17.2 10.2 0.0
1808 94.8 72.6 0.0 31.0 0.0
1809 74.6 63.3 13.4 6.3 11.2
1810 68.0 69.0 24.2 4.3 13.9
1811 82.7 69.2 24.7 11.1 8.0
1812 95.4 57.6 19.9 4.8 5.9
1813 91.0 56.2 15.8 5.2 17.6
1814 40.3 69.4 0.0 16.6 7.6
1815 90.8 61.4 39.4 4.6 30.6
1816 85.8 62.8 70.8 7.1 8.7
1817 79.0 75.8 10.4 1.4 0.0
1818 91.3 25.4 74.7 11.3 0.0
1819 86.3 13.4 38.8 44.7 2.8
1820 19.8 88.3 0.0 0.0 2.4
Sources: ‘Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations and Portuguese Colonies’, Portugal’s
Balance of Trade with the United States. In 1814, 19 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively, of American
dyes and assortments of meats were imported by Portugal.
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As we have already highlighted, flour accounted for most of the Portuguese
imports of cereals from the United States, accounting for 75.6 per cent of
the total cereal imports in 1812-1814, mainly because of the increase in the
quantities demanded by the Portuguese population and British troops. This
was also a period during which Portugal ceased commercial relationships with
certain markets. Lisbon was the main entrance port for the American cereals.
The major contributions to the Portuguese demand for American cereals were
based on flour (1810-1813), corn (1811) and wheat (1811-1812), the latter two
in smaller amounts (see Table 6, especially the highlighted sections).
As Table 7 shows, the United States was the main origin of flour for Por-
tugal, not only during the period of major demand but for the entire period.
Available data depict 1812 as the year during which the peak value for flour
was attained mainly because of quantities, as the price of 1,100 re´is per
alqueire was not significantly different from the prices for the years 1810, 1811
and 1813 (respectively 978, 973 and 960 re´is per alqueire). The increased
demand for American corn in 1811 and 1813 represented 95 and 97 per cent,
respectively, of all corn imported and also reveals United Staes as the former
main supplier.
American wheat increased in importance among the imported cereals,
particularly in 1811 and 1812, corresponding to a contraction in Spanish
wheat imports because of the Peninsular War. The United States was the
second-most important supplier, representing between 26 and 28 per cent of
the total Portuguese wheat imports. During the war, the other main impor-
ters of wheat were Great Britain, Spain, Italy and the Berber countries.
American rice imports were also imperative during the conflict, with 1813
being the year of the most significant totals, equalling 965 contos, although
this was less than the quantities for the other cereals.
TABLE 5
PORTUGUESE IMPORTS OF CEREALS FROM THE UNITED STATES, 1796-1831
(UNIT: CONTOS DE RE´IS)
Year Percentage of total imports Total Flour Corn Wheat Rice
1796-1800 64.3 279 40 150 10 79
1801-1807 88.3 1,080 684 286 99 11
1808-1811 80.1 3,589 2,057 854 347 331
1812-1814 75.6 6,222 4,177 1,149 313 584
1815-1820 75.5 650 161 357 78 53
1821-1831 11.0 19 4 2 5 8
Sources: ‘Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations and Portuguese Colonies’, Portugal’s
Balance of Trade with the United States.
Note: The period totals may not correspond to the sum of the individual categories given the rounding
of the figures.
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The relevance of American flour supplies during the Peninsular War,
which is evident from the study of the quantitative sources, can be further
analysed by cross-referencing them with two important qualitative sources,
TABLE 6
QUANTITIES OF MAIN PRODUCTS IMPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES,
1796-1820 (UNIT: ALQUEIRES)
Year Total amount of cereals Flour Corn Wheat
1796 45,792 1,164 44,628 —
1797 211,223 149,598 49,125 12,500
1798 334,553 51,701 240,596 42,256
1799 668,927 24,012 612,435 32,480
1800 669,826 93,012 576,814 —
1801 2,111,254 1,365,596 738,976 6,682
1802 1,579,550 552,470 985,136 41,944
1803 2,580,620 1,003,902 1,055,260 521,458
1804 2,098,063 881,003 965,418 251,642
1805 444,421 182,108 187,886 74,427
1806 1,278,070 894,702 314,314 69,054
1807 1,305,178 799,782 382,521 122,875
1808 76,632 52,368 0 24,264
1809 1,180,766 830,595 265,437 84,734
1810 2,418,371 1,510,688 784,550 123,133
1811 11,874,203 6,248,672 4,484,829 1,140,702
1812 9,405,856 8,209,788 600,872 595,196
1813 5,280,721 3,452,532 1,500,059 328,130
1814 224,017 178,974 0 45,043
1815 977,141 275,556 651,446 50,139
1816 1,279,537 114,360 1,088,987 76,190
1817 423,843 335,736 80,723 7,384
1818 2,517,496 0 2,264,177 253,319
1819 1,122,889 86,400 570,532 465,957
1820 40,602 40,602 0 0
The highlighted section in grey shows the most significant period of importation of cereal from the
United States.
Sources: ‘Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations and Portuguese Colonies’, Portugal’s
Balance of Trade with the United States. In 1813 it is not possible to decompose the value of 286 contos of
wheat imported from the United States in quantities and price. The unit for cereals is alqueire, although in
the case of flour, barricas and barris are also units; these are not listed as they correspond to irrelevant
import values.
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TABLE 7
QUANTITIES OF MOST IMPORTANT IMPORTED FLOUR, 1796-1820
(UNIT: ALQUEIRES)
Year Total amount of cereals USA (per cent) Others (per cent)
1796 148.997 0.8 Prussia: 98.6
Other parts of Germany: 0.6
1797 178.806 83.7 England: 10.8
Other parts of Germany: 3.1
France: 2.1
Hamburg: 0.3
1798 51.701 100.0 —
1799 27.096 88.6 Hamburg: 11.4
1800 93.012 100.0 —
1801 1,381.148 98.9 England: 1.1
1802 552.470 100.0 —
1803 1,065.732 94.2 England: 5.8
1804 954.014 92.3 England: 5.9
Prussia: 1.0
1805 805.106 22.6 France: 65.2
Prussia: 7.4
England: 3.9
Spain: 0.3
1806 1,014.736 88.2 Spain: 8.0
France: 2.6
England: 1.2
1807 862.195 92.8 England: 4.4
France: 2.0
Italy: 0.9
1808 183.050 28.6 England: 31.5
Spain: 23.7
Berber nations: 9.7
Italy: 6.5
1809 916.113 90.7 England: 5.4
Spain: 4.0
1810 1,991.081 75.9 Spain: 16.6
England: 7.5
1811 6,994.658 89.3 England: 7.7
Spain: 2.7
Berber nations: 0.2
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namely consular and military correspondences. As it is clear that Portugal
imported flour mostly from the United States, it is quite telling to find
references to that product in a 19th-century handwritten document23, found
at Tribunal de Contas, corresponding to the years 1815 and 1816, just after
the Paris Treaty had been signed. It shows clearly that the Portuguese army
listed «American flour» in its military monthly reports of acquisitions under
«General Account of Provisions», Conta Geral de Ge´neros.
TABLE 7 (Cont.)
Year Total amount of cereals USA (per cent) Others (per cent)
1812 8,314.730 98.7 England: 0.8
Spain: 0.5
1813 3,563.258 96.9 England: 2.6
Spain: 0.5
1814 228.402 78.4 France: 10.4
England: 9.6
Hamburg: 1.6
1815 397.112 69.4 France: 19.7
England: 9.5
The Netherlands: 0.5
1816 136.344 83.9 England: 16.1
1817 505.104 66.5 England: 26.3
Italy: 3.4
The Netherlands: 3.0
Spain: 0.8
1818 26.040 0.0 France: 46.5
Russian: 44.2
Sweden: 9.2
1819 86.400 100.0 —
1820 44.298 91.7 England: 4.6
France: 2.7
Hamburg: 0.5
Denmark: 0.5
The highlighted section in grey shows the most significant period of importation of flour.
Sources: ‘Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations and Portuguese Colonies’, Portugal’s
Balance of Trade with the United States. The unit for cereals is alqueire, although in the case of flour,
barricas and barris are also used; these are not listed as they correspond to very small import values.
23 Arquivo Tribunal de Contas (Archives of the Audit Court): ER 5451.
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In fact, cross-checking this reference with the previously presented data,
and assuming that «American flour» refers to flour imported from the United
States, the quantities acquired by the army corresponded, respectively, to
30 and 56 per cent of the imported flour (see earlier tables) in 1815 (83,969
alqueires) and 1816 (64,140 alqueires).
During the Peninsular War, in letters dated June 2024, August 825 and
December 10, 181026 from Joze´ Rademaker, the Portuguese Consul in Phi-
ladelphia27, who was persistently requested to ensure that American traders
exported flour to Lisbon, explained to the Portuguese Ministry of War and
Foreign Affairs that many of those traders did not want to do so, because of
the low profits obtained from that trade, after covering their expenses,
insurance, freight and taxes28. From details contained in a letter dated
August 8 of that year, it becomes clear that the price for flour was 8,800 re´is/
barrica in Philadelphia, yet it was being sold for 12,800 re´is/barrica in Portugal.
The only way to persuade the traders, as Joze´ Rademaker suggests, was to
increase the selling price, or to lower the duty fees on the products they
wanted to import from Portugal, namely white wines. However, Rademaker
continued to publicise the opportunity to the traders at all ports, inducing
further competition, to merchants who wanted to export wheat and flour
to Portugal, and he made references to the fact that several ships had
left Baltimore bound for Lisbon, and another four from Philadelphia, with
several more waiting to leave New York and the Carolinas29. Although the
Portuguese statistics for each external market do not provide information on
the regional provenance of the imported products, the relevance of the
Philadelphia and New York ports in this trade was also confirmed by data
from a military source30, a document dated February 25, 1811, which makes
it possible to trace the main origins of that American flour, namely to
New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore.
24 Letter sent in answer to a request to increase wheat and flour exports to Portugal, Instituto
dos Arquivos Nacionais Torre do Tombo (Institute of National Archives/Torre do Tombo), Box 62074.
25 Idem.
26 Idem.
27 In 1810, the American Consuls in Portugal were: William Jarvie in Lisbon, James L. Cathcart
in Madeira, John B. Dabney in the Azores and Henry Hill in San Salvador in Brazil. Document no.
151, Consuls and Commercial Agents, Table Commerce and Navigation 820 in American State
Papers – Legislative and Executive Documents of the Congress of the United States. Commerce and
Navigation, Vol 1. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html.
28 Letter from Joze´ Rademaker to D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz, Philadelphia, August 8, 1810, on the
shipment of flour to Portugal, Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais Torre do Tombo (Institute of National
Archives/Torre do Tombo), Box 62074.
29 Letter from Jose´ Rademaker, dated December 10, 1810, on the shipment of flours to Por-
tugal, Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais Torre do Tombo (Institute of National Archives/Torre do
Tombo), Box 62074.
30 Arquivo Histo´rico Militar (Military Historic Archive), PT AHM/DIV/1/24/245/31. Report from
Jose´ Rademaker to D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz, minister and secretary of state for War Affairs, on food
products and list of flour prices in the United States.
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This same source enables us to identify the price of flour in the United
States, namely between 9 dollars 75 cents and 10 dollars in New York, 10
dollars and 50 cents in Philadelphia and 9 dollars and 50 cents in Baltimore.
For all these examples, this source reinforces the idea of seemingly low
profits for traders, as referred to in Rademaker’s consular correspondence, as
it indicates that the expenses, insurance, freight and taxes amounted to
between 3 and 3 dollars 50 cents per barrica, which corresponded approxi-
mately to 2,756 re´is, when considering an exchange rate of 848 re´is per dollar
found for 180931. By applying this exchange rate to the figures mentioned in
Rademaker’s letter from 1810, it can be concluded that the profit was initially
fairly low, around 1,244 re´is/barrica (1 dollar 47 cents/barrica), amounting to
10.8 per cent as the difference between 12,800 re´is and 8,800 re´is, 4,000 re´is,
excluding 2,756 re´is for insurance, freight and taxes.
Was the Portuguese metropolis the main consumer of the growing
external demand for cereal in the period that followed the French invasions
in Portugal? Was the U.S. market part of the solution? If that was the case,
the Spanish cereal imports should also show a great rise given the geo-
graphical proximity and the quality of the Spanish wheat and the disparity of
prices between the two countries, considering that the Spanish cereal was
cheaper than the Portuguese. Curiously enough, the Portuguese demand for
Spanish cereal in the first three decades of the 19th century reached its peak
not from 1812 to 1814, but from 1808 to 1811. We maintain that this sig-
nificant rise in the U.S. cereal exports to Portugal between 1812 and 1814
confirms the thesis that the metropolis acted as a support platform to feed its
greatest ally during the war between the United States and what was then the
British colony of Canada. A state of war between the United States and
Britain did not provide a hindrance to the trade, on the contrary.
The consular correspondences for the year of highest American flour
imports, which was 1812 (8,209,788 alqueires according to the Portuguese
trade balances), make interesting references to specific quantities of this
product for that same year. One letter stated that four Portuguese vessels left
Philadelphia on July 22, 1812, bound for Oporto, with 2,135 barricas of flour
and, on the very next day, another five American vessels left Philadelphia for
Lisbon containing 9,800 barricas, and «ymuch more would go if the fear of
being captured by the English did not discourage themy»32. Thus, the fear
of capture, and loss of profits and assets, by the English naval forces was a
31 Letter dated December 29, 1809, Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais Torre do Tombo (Institute
of National Archives/Torre do Tombo), Box 62077.
32 Letter dated July 23, 1812, on the difficulty of bringing flour to Portugal due to the war with
England and what else is suggested about the Portuguese crews, Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais
Torre do Tombo (Institute of National Archives/Torre do Tombo), Box 62074. The War of 1812 was
fought between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and its
colonies: Upper Canada [Ontario], Lower Canada [Quebec], Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, and
Bermuda.
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real possibility. Yet, most of the time, they allowed this trade to take place,
even during the actual conflict with the United States, the War of 1812.
However, this source makes no reference to the values or prices involved
with taking those exports to the Portuguese markets. It is a reasonable
conjecture that the profits, and the relative prices received by the importers,
in this trade must have risen substantially along with both the risks involved
and the heightened demand caused by the conflict33.
Unfortunately, in the Portuguese trade statistics, quantities of imported
flour are not expressed as barricas, but mainly as alqueires, and there is no
convenient conversion factor to be found for these units. There are, however,
some records given in barricas and barris34, although these referred to
transactions with very low values. Curiously, the quantities of barricas of
flour referred to in the above-mentioned letter are not accounted for in the
Portuguese Trade Balance records. Considering that those quantities only
refer to 2 days of vessel movements and that a huge demand for American
flour is revealed by several of the letters researched, together with the
opportunity to cross-check the quantitative and qualitative sources, it seems
plausible that the amount of flour that had been converted to alqueires for the
records in 1812 was an error in the records or a manifestation of contraband,
or at least remains open to discussion. The latter explanation would certainly
fit with the pattern of this type of trade, with large expected profits.
Why did the Portuguese import wheat flour, rather than the grain? A memoir
on the trade between Portugal and United States, written by Ignacio Palyart in
1788, states that wheat was one of the most important farming products in the
states of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware, exported mainly to
Portugal, Spain and some other Mediterranean ports. France and England only
imported wheat when facing a year of really bad harvests and scarce supplies.
During the latter half of the 1780s, Portugal imported mainly raw wheat, thereby
avoiding manufacturing costs, after a period when imports were preferably of
wheat in the form of flour. This change in demand affected Philadelphians so
much that in 1786 they overcharged for Portuguese wines, up to 20 per cent
more than in other states. However, Portugal could unload goods at other ports
as well, which then entered Pennsylvania illegally, thus avoiding those duties.
The importance of Philadelphia in the flour trade was heightened by the fact
that wartime Great Britain was very dependent on North American markets. For
example, Lower Canada was a great producer of wheat, which unfortunately
could only be exported by way of the St. Lawrence River, which was frozen most
of the year. Therefore, Canada’s trade was underdeveloped to the benefit of
33 On the broader trade networks between Southern Europe and North America, see Lydon
(1965).
34 Trade balances were for the years 1813 (2.600 at a price of 11.604 re´is/barrica by Setubal),
1816 (2.560 priced 8.200 re´is/barrica by Oporto) and 1817 (2.131 for 12.620 re´is/barrica by Oporto),
1818 (20.579: 13.210 by Lisbon and 7.069 by Oporto both at 9.890 re´is/barrica and 300 by Figueira
priced between 6.000 and 9.890 re´is/barrica) and finally 1821 (9.609 at 5.000 re´is/barrica by Lisbon).
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Philadelphia in particular, as «y Philadelphians monopolised wheat and
transformed it into flour in their ports, re-exporting it to Portugal and other
kingdomsy»35. The disruption of agricultural life and destruction of most of the
mills because of the Peninsular War may have been the reason for the shift in
the Portuguese demand from grain back to flour once again.
To facilitate trade, Portugal wanted to buy American vessels and use them
under the Portuguese flag in order to transport flour to Portugal. However, the
existing trade treaty between England and Portugal demanded that the owner of
the vessel, its captain and one-third of the sailors be under the orders of the
Portuguese Prince Regent. This reality prevented many other vessels from taking
part in the flour trade, as there were not enough Portuguese sailors in the United
States for that purpose. In order to avoid this problem, in 1812, Joze´ Rade-
maker36 suggested that the Portuguese should follow the Spanish model in this:
Only the owner of the vessel and its captain should have to be Portuguese.
The war that pitted United States and England against one another from
1812 to 1815 –– because of, among other reasons, Britain’s annoyance with
U.S. trade with France and American impressments of British sailors, as well
as British support of Indian raids –– was accompanied by several attempts by
England to put an embargo on U.S. ports, adding many obstacles to inter-
national trade. The trade between Portugal and United States was no excep-
tion; thus, it faced another challenge, as many of the American traders who
operated with English licences under the American flag exporting flour to
Spain and Portugal saw their businesses compromised. Again, Joze´ Rademaker
attempted to persuade several Americans to become naturalised as Portuguese
in order to run vessels with the Portuguese flag and using Portuguese pass-
ports. The forty-nine passports, which arrived in Philadelphia in 1812, were
reported as insufficient. In fact, three vessels with food supplies left New York
on September 7, 1812 under such conditions, one heading to Lisbon and two to
the island of Fayal in the Azores. Clearly problems with wartime situations
could be overcome with fairly practical solutions.
From the various Portuguese sources mentioned above, indubitably the
trade relations between Portugal and the United States were mainly
anchored by the Portuguese demand for American cereals in 1812-1814.
Although the American sources, namely American State Papers, exhibit a
lack of annual records of American imports and exports detailed by products
for each external market during the period in question, a further study of that
source revealed that, from 1808 to 1814, the Portuguese market was also an
important destination for American exports, ranking as the second-most
35 Memoir Observaça˜o sobre o come´rcio dos Estados Unidos d’America com Portugal por
Ignacio Palyart (Observation on trade between United States and Portugal by Ignacio Palyart) in
1788. Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais Torre do Tombo (Institute of National Archives/Torre do
Tombo), Box 62109.
36 In a letter dated September 7, 1812, Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais Torre do Tombo
(Institute of National Archives/Torre do Tombo), Box 62074.
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important in 1812 and 1813; third in 1809, 1811 and 1814; and fourth in 1810
and sixth in 1808 (see Table 8).
The crucial issue of the supply of American cereals to Portugal shows
that, although distant, help from America was essential for the survival of the
Portuguese people and the Luso–British army, an indirect but no less impor-
tant means of support. These economic transactions enabled the survival of
the Portuguese people and English troops during the most difficult phases of
the Napoleonic conflicts. The expected profits also rose dramatically during the
most intense years of the war, only to decline again during peace time.
3.2. Portuguese Exports to the United States
Do exports reinforce this story? Research focusing on Portuguese trade
statistics reveals that the Portuguese exports to the United States were much
less significant compared to the Portuguese imports from the United States.
The U.S. demand for goods imported from Portugal focused mainly on wine,
Patacas Castelhanas (Spanish silver coins) and salt, as imports of those three
products constituted 65-98 per cent of the total value exported to the United
States from 1796 to 182037, as shown in Table 938.
The highest value of Spanish silver coins exported was reached in 1812,
totalling 1,524 contos. Comparatively, in 1805, the total was 581 contos, and
TABLE 8
POSITION OF PORTUGUESE MARKET IN TERMS OF VALUE AND DESTINATION
OF U.S. EXPORTS, 1808-1814
Portugal
Year American export values Position Percentage of American exports
1808 22,430,960 6th 2.4
1809 52,203,233 3rd 15.9
1810 66,757,970 4th 11.5
1811 61,316,833 3rd 18.7
1812 38,527,236 2nd 24.4
1813 27,855,997 2nd 36.2
1814 6,627,441 3rd 8.5
Sources: This information has been collated from American State Papers — Legislative and Executive
Documents of the Congress of the United States. The source does not differentiate exports by products.
37 The year 1825 was an isolated year among the period 1821-1831, with a relevant value of
exports, as mentioned above: 654 contos from which 561 contos corresponded to wool.
38 This excludes 1814 and 1815 mainly because of the demand for textiles in those years.
Although the Portuguese exports to the United States were irrelevant in 1814, in the following year
they reached 590 contos –– 57 per cent of the total exports.
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TABLE 9
MAIN PORTUGUESE PRODUCTS EXPORTED TO THE UNITED STATES,
1796-1820 (PER CENT AND CONTOS)
Wine Salt
Patacas castelhanas,
Spanish silver
coins (1)
Year
Share of
total exports
Percentage
of exports Contos
Percentage
of exports Contos
Percentage
of exports Contos
1796 89.5 45.7 201.7 19.6 86.6 24.1 106.3
1797 84.4 48.6 129.2 27.4 72.9 8.3 22.1
1798 85.4 36.8 104.3 25.3 71.8 23.3 66.1
1799 93.0 24.8 156.6 7.2 45.1 61.0 384.6
1800 94.2 20.1 141.6 8.8 62.1 65.2 459.6
1801 86.9 42.4 188.4 8.7 38.8 35.8 158.7
1802 87.8 34.4 138.2 22.8 91.6 30.6 122.6
1803 88.6 16.2 85.9 15.6 82.6 56.7 300.2
1804 87.9 43.6 145.8 20.2 87.7 18.2 60.8
1805 93.6 17.4 144.0 5.8 47.6 70.4 581.4
1806 89.8 42.5 194.8 12.1 55.4 35.3 161.6
1807 92.8 42.1 239.7 15.6 88.7 35.1 200.2
1808 80.7 65.9 54.3 14.8 12.2 0.0 0.0
1809 77.1 49.4 132.8 27.7 74.4 0.0 0.0
1810 69.3 16.5 39 47.8 112.9 5.1 12.0
1811 72.6 8.8 55.5 37.5 236.1 26.3 165.6
1812 93.9 4.6 88.7 10.8 209.9 78.5 1,523.7
1813 64.7 2.0 7.3 62.7 226.5 0.0 0.0
1814 3.8 1.0 2.0 2.8 5.6 0.0 0.0
1815 19.0 10.3 106.4 5.7 58.9 3.0 31.2
1816 83.4 33.1 190.4 15.3 88.1 35.0 201.6
1817 97.9 10.5 48.8 6.1 28.5 81.3 378.4
1818 76.9 5.0 11.0 31.7 69.5 40.2 88.2
1819 89.0 1.7 3.2 37.5 71.2 49.7 94.4
1820 96.8 41.2 68.4 39.5 65.6 16.1 26.8
Sources: ‘Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations and Portuguese Colonies’, Portugal’s
Balance of Trade with the United States.
Note: During the period under analysis, there are several other references to this aggregated product in
Portuguese trade balances: From 1798 to 1800; it appears as «Silver as patacas and pesetas» and in 1818
under the designation of «Patacas and onças castelhanas»; from 1801 to 1806 this product was referred to
by «Silver as patacas,» and merely by «Patacas» in 1807 and 1820. It is assumed that all were Spanish silver
coins. In the year 1810, wool represented 13.7 per cent of exports, the third major exported product. In the
years 1808, 1809 and 1813, only salt and wine in the first two cases and salt in 1813 represented more than
10 per cent of Portuguese exports to the United States. In 1815, fabrics (cotton, wool and linen) represented
57 per cent of Portuguese exports to the United States. In the previous year, fabrics were also the most
important product, together with tea, but the values were irrelevant. See Moreira (2007a, pp. 95-103) for
further discussion about Portuguese wool exports to the United States.
CRISTINA MOREIRA/JARI ELORANTA
418 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
in 1800 it reached 460 contos. We can conclude that the Portuguese exports
to the United States for most of the period under study were quite modest,
with the exception of the Spanish silver coins, specifically in the first year of
the War of 1812. The Portuguese trade statistics indicate six origins for the
exported products: Portuguese Kingdom, Portuguese Islands, Brazil, Africa,
Asia and re-exports. Although the origin of wine and salt was the Kingdom,
Spanish silver coins were recorded as re-exported. The re-exported Spanish
silver coins were not a means of payment but a product, according to Por-
tuguese trade balance sources, namely those for the year 181739. Imports of
Spanish silver coins were clearly insufficient to meet the external demand.
Therefore, this product had either joined the large stream of contraband
imports as it was not recorded among the imports, or the recorded origin
should be the United Kingdom. However, at that time, neither Portugal nor
its colonies were extracting silver. The Spanish silver was part of the illegal
trade, which can be seen in the fact that tobacco smugglers in Portugal,
namely in Campo Maior, exported tobacco to Spain in exchange for illegally
introduced Spanish silver coins40.
The Alvara´41 of October 17, 1808 issued by the Portuguese Regent
Prince42 makes it clear that there were Spanish silver coins circulating in
Portugal, as it is mentioned that the English Army in Portugal was effectively
paid with them43. Owing to the great increase in the quantity of silver coins
in circulation, the Portuguese Prince Regent had to recognise the importance
of the pataca, and he assigned the value of 800 re´is to each pataca. It is
obvious that patacas used as army payments could not be expected to be
found in the trade balance data.
It seems that both the quantitative and qualitative evidence, based on
Portugal’s export and import data, point in the same direction. In the context
of this era of global war, Portugal, a small player in the international arena
and an old British ally, built a bridge between two important economic
actors, the United States and Great Britain, purely out of need on the British
side and profit opportunities on the U.S. side. Portugal relied on American
cereal in order to feed the Portuguese and British armies operating in Portugal
and, on the other hand, supplied the United States with silver that basically
originated from British payments to that common army. This increase in trade
39 Balança Geral do Commercio do Reyno de Portugal com os seus Dominios e As Naço˜es
Estrangeiras Em o Anno de 1817, Portugal’s Trade Balance with Foreign Nations and Portuguese
colonies in 1817.
40 Balança Geral do Commercio do Reyno de Portugal com os seus Dominios e As Naço˜es
Estrangeiras Em o Anno de 1818, Portugal’s Trade Balance with Foreign Nations and Portuguese
colonies in 1818.
41 Alvara´ was a document issued by the Prince Regent.
42 Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais Torre do Tombo (Institute of National Archives/Torre do
Tombo), Box 62150.
43 See Moreira (2007b). The military expenditures during the Peninsular War had the English
government’s financial support; the values are expressed in re´is and pounds sterling.
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began with the imposition of the Continental blockade. The War of 1812 simply
expanded this trade even further, raising relative prices and increasing the
attractiveness of illicit modes of trade. Nonetheless, most of those opportunities
were relatively short-lived, as the great powers were no longer so dependent on
the trade networks and crucial commodities of the neutral or small (or weaker)
nations during peace time.
4. CONCLUSION
The coming of modernity, industrial age and ultimately the hegemony of
Great Britain emerged out of series of massive conflicts, thrusting Europe
and its colonies into the first real-world war from the early 1790s to 1815.
These conflicts forced countries to choose sides and strained old alliances.
Related to these processes, a new political and economic, albeit weak, power
entered into the fray during this period of transition, from the 1790s to 1815,
the United States. In this article, we wanted to re-examine the role played by
smaller and/or weaker (sometimes also neutral) powers, which would apply
to both Portugal and the United States, and the importance of trade oppor-
tunities during a time of war. On the basis of new sources and data on
Portuguese–American trade, we wished to analyse why and to what extent it
was possible for Portugal to trade with the United States, despite its apparent
animosity of Great Britain, Portugal’s oldest ally.
Portugal suffered three French invasions during Napoleon’s rule, and, as it
did not adhere to the Continental blockade, it experienced trade restrictions
with several of its former suppliers. Thus, the Peninsular War caused severe
disruptions of agricultural production in Portugal, and the United States,
despite its strained relations with an ally of Portugal, Great Britain, became a
key supplier for the Portuguese civilians and the military forces residing in the
country. By analysing primary sources, it became very clear that the most
relevant growth period of U.S. exports to Portugal was 1807-1812. The main
products imported from United States during that period were cereals, both as
grain and as flour. The sudden increase in the demand for cereals was clearly
due to the need to feed both the Portuguese people and the Portuguese and
English armies, engaged in fighting the French on Portuguese territory. The
threatened position of the peninsula awarded the Portuguese and American
entrepreneurs some room to manoeuvre in the international markets, despite
considerable British annoyance at American trade practices.
However, after 1812, the war pitting the United States against England
brought meagre difficulties for the United States–Portuguese trade, as U.S.
shipments with cereals and flour were at times captured by England. Mean-
while, Portugal exported mainly wine, silver in the form of Spanish patacas
and salt, although the export values were much lower than the imports during
the period of more significant trade. Striking is also the prominent position of
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the Portuguese market as a U.S. client market, during the Peninsular War,
reaching more than a 10 per cent share of all U.S. exports from 1809 until
1813. Obviously, then, the British Navy was not a massive obstacle for this
trade, especially as they also benefitted from the inflow of cereals and other
goods, and the expected profits were high. Illicit trade also flourished. Business
acumen and economic needs trumped the principles of war and diplomacy.
However, weak states like Portugal and the United States gained new market
opportunities only in the short run — the return to normalcy in the 1820s
erased many of these gains and networks. The examination of the structural
characteristics of the Portuguese trade statistics confirmed this as well: the
War of 1812 represented an expansion, albeit most likely a temporary state of
affairs, of this trade. The reversal of the political situation after the second
defeat of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna once again changed the
external environment for trade. Clearly, even total war was not always bad for
trade, at least for Portugal in this instance.
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